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I.  INTRODUCTION. 
From the beginning of scientific assessment of climate change in the late 1970’s 
to the most recent conference of the parties (COP) to the Kyoto Protocol in Doha in 
2012, the international community has been attempting to establish a workable legal 
regime to deal with climate change. The purpose of this article is to explore some of 
the legal effects this emerging international climate change regime may have on 
energy prices in the foreseeable future. 
Specifically, this article in section II article accepts certain predicates relating to 
climate change and energy prices. In section III, it lays out briefly the thirty year, 
largely unsuccessful, history of the attempts to establish an international legal regime 
to deal with climate change. Section IV argues that despite the lack of success in 
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New York. I would like to thank my research assistants, Anna Ovcharenko and Katherine 
Moran for their valuable help with this article.  
2 THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:1 
 
 
establishing an international legal regime, certain legal principles have been 
established that will affect energy prices in the foreseeable future. Section V 
concludes that those legal principles should be taken into account by states, 
legislators, policy makers, energy companies, advocates, consumers and investors in 
making energy pricing decisions and energy pricing predictions in the coming 
decades. 
II.  CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY PRICING PREDICATES. 
For purposes of this article, certain fundamental assumptions are accepted. First, 
climate change is occurring by the accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the 
atmosphere. Second, since the industrial revolution the activities of human beings in 
the use of energy resources to do work are a major contributor to greenhouse gases. 
Third, the production and use of fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) are the 
primary source of mankind’s GHG released into the atmosphere. Fourth, climate 
change produces and potentially will produce serious and potentially harmful 
adverse effects on global and local societies, including warming of the planet, sea 
level rise, changes in ocean temperatures, melting of the polar ice caps and mountain 
snow packs, melting of permafrost, weird weather events, increase in insects, loss of 
coastal habitats, changes in agricultural lands and the like. Fifth, for the most part, 
the costs of climate change occasioned by mankind’s production and use of fossil 
fuel energy resources is not accurately reflected in wholesale or retail energy prices 
and remain largely external to energy purchasing decisions. Sixth energy and gross 
domestic product (GDP) are closely linked. For developing countries to develop 
economically, they must have affordable and reliable sources of energy and for 
developed countries to maintain their economies they also must have affordable 
reliable energy sources. Seventh, it is likely that demand for energy overtime will 
increase and not decrease. Populations are increasing and there are still around a 
billion people without electricity. New voracious energy demands from the computer 
and cell phone industry are now robust and still growing. Eighth, energy supply and 
demand are intimately influenced by price. Finally, law (international and domestic) 
as well as markets can be expected to address the impact of energy production and 
use on climate change. 
III.  THE ROLE OF THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME IN 
FUTURE ENERGY PRICES. 
Both domestic climate change-related law and emerging international law affect 
energy prices. Domestically, of course, states have clean energy and greenhouse gas 
initiatives that affect energy prices like renewable energy portfolios and feed in 
tariffs to encourage renewable energy projects. Regional arrangements like the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) have carbon trading schemes or 
programs of one sort or the other that are beginning to influence energy prices. 
What is less appreciated and often somewhat overlooked is the growing impact 
of emerging international climate change legal principles that are relevant to energy 
prices. This article suggests that despite the relative lack of success of the 
international community to forge an international regime to deal with climate change 
over the past decades, certain enduring principles have nonetheless solidified out of 
that process that may shape the future pricing of energy products. 
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A.  Climate Change, Energy Prices and international Regulation. 
It has long been “officially” appreciated domestically and internationally that 
even putative international regulation of greenhouse gases is relevant to energy 
product pricing. For example, over two decades ago, the Wisconsin Public Service 
Commission tackled the problem of putting a dollar amount in electric rates in 
anticipation of international climate change regulation: 
“Because of widespread concern about the risks of global warming at 
state, national and international levels, future regulations are likely to 
require the utility industry to limit its release    of these gases. If so, 
utilities would incur real economic cost in order to comply with these 
regulations.” 
* * * 
“A national and international consensus to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions is emerging. When the likelihood of future regulation is high, it 
is reasonable to estimate the cost of compliance to utilities. Ignoring this 
financial risk would be imprudent.” 
* * * 
“Monetizing the risk of greenhouse gas regulation is a prudent means of 
reducing utility business risk by hedging against the future. . .[and] 
considering the likelihood of . . . international greenhouse gas 
regulations.”2 
In 2013, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report on energy pricing reforms 
tied together future energy pricing and greenhouse gases: 
“Even future generations are affected [by underpriced energy] through 
reduced availability of key inputs for growth and the damaging effects of 
increased energy consumption on greenhouse gas emissions and global 
warming.” 
* * * 
“Removing [economic energy] subsidies could lead to a 13 percent 
decline in CO2 [carbon dioxide] emissions.”3 
B.  The Emerging International Climate Change Regime. 
Despite the sort of longstanding domestic and international acceptance of the 
connections among climate change, energy prices and international regulation, an 
international climate change regime has been very slow to emerge, leading to 
observations that there is little international climate change “law” to apply. 
                                                          
 2 Advance Plans for Constr. Of Facilities, 136 P.U.R. 4th 153 (Wi.P.S.C. 1992); see 
generally, James E. Hickey, Jr. The Globalization of Domestic Environmental Law, 14 
NYSBA ENV’TL LAW SECTION J.16 (1994). 
 3 International Monetary Fund, Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications, at 1, 5 
(January 28, 2013). http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813.pdf.  
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The following selected timeline from 1979 through 2012 illustrates the 
challenging, rather tortured, path toward an emerging climate change regime over 
the past three decades.4 
In 1979, The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) sponsored the first 
scientific World Climate Conference (WCC) which ultimately led to the 
establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
In 1988, the IPCC was established by the WMO and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP).5 The IPCC seeks “to provide the world with a 
clear scientific view of the current state of knowledge in climate change and its 
potential environmental and socio-economic impacts”.6 Its first assessment report 
came out in 1990 and its fifth assessment is due in 2013/2014.7 In general terms, the 
IPCC assessment reports establish the importance of climate change and that it 
merits political action to address. 
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was adopted and it entered into force in 1994.8 The UNFCCC in Article 
2 set forth the twofold agenda for all subsequent conferences of the parties (COP) 
that has guided the efforts in following years. That is, the “ultimate” objective is first 
to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level to prevent dangerous 
man-made interference with the climate system and, second, to do so in a timeframe 
to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change in a sustainable way. 
The UNFCCC is legally significant for what it does not do. It does not establish a 
timeframe for achieving those Article 2 agenda goals. It does not impose any 
obligation to curtail energy production and use that contributes GHG to the 
atmosphere. It contains no enforcement mechanisms or specific targets to be 
achieved. It is largely an aspirational legal instrument. 
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted and it entered into 
force in 2005. (The United States withdrew from the Protocol in 2001.) The Protocol 
set internationally binding GHG emissions targets to reduce emissions below 1990 
levels by the period 2008-2012. Kyoto placed a heavier burden on developed 
countries to curtail GHG emissions than on developing countries. These targets have 
not been met.  
In 2007, the COP met in Bali, Indonesia. The COP adopted the Bali Roadmap 
which included a Bali Action Plan meant to set a path and process for reaching a 
shared vision and to deal with climate mitigation, with adaptation, with technology 
                                                          
 4 For a complete timeline see Background on the UNFCC: The International Response to 
Climate Change, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
 5 History, IPCC, http://ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml (last visited Oct. 
19, 2013).  
 6 Organization, IPCC, http://ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 
2013). 
 7 History, IPPC http://ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml. (last visited Oct. 
19, 2013). The IPCC does not itself undertake either climate change research or monitoring of 
climate information and data. 
 8 Full Text of the Convention, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential _background/convention/background/items/1349.php (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2013).  
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and with financing. The UNFCCC website accurately terms the Bali effort “highly 
ambitious”, “overly optimistic” and one that “underestimated the complexity both of 
climate change as a problem and of crafting a global response to it.”9 
In 2011, the COP met in Durban, South Africa. The Durban Conference stated 
the need for a “fresh” “blueprint” to address climate change beyond 2020.10 The 
COP committed to a plan to “come closer over time” to meet the “ultimate 
objective” of Article 2 of the UNFCC to stabilize GHG concentrations.11 The stated 
goal was to achieve reduction in GHG emissions “to keep average global 
temperatures rising no more than two degrees above their pre-industrial level…”12 
The need to “build and preserve trust” among countries was noted as well the need 
for “bolder and bigger actions”. 
Most recently, the COP met in Doha, Qatar.  The most significant action taken by 
the COP was to adopt a proposed amendment to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to 
establish a new commitment period for countries to curtail GHG emissions since the 
old commitment period expired in 2012.13 The new period would be from 2013 to 
2021. The COP also committed to reach a new agreement by 2015. Of less 
significance was the declaration to open a “gateway” to “greater ambition and 
action” on GHG emissions to “strengthen resolve”, “to streamline negotiations”, to 
increase “ambition” to cut GHG and “to help vulnerable countries to adapt” to 
climate change, and to make “progress toward” helping developing countries with 
financial and technological support in their efforts to make clean energy investments  
and have sustainable growth. 
There are several factors that help to explain the lack of progress of the 
international climate change regime toward firm and specific legal obligations to 
internalize the externalities of GHG emissions in human activity including in prices 
for the production and use of energy that produces GHG emissions. 
First, climate change involves aspects of a commons (i.e. the upper atmosphere 
used by all to dispose of GHG) with no legal right to exclude any one nation from so 
using the atmosphere. This commons characteristic impedes reaching an agreement. 
For example, it took nations almost thirty years from 1967 to 1994 to agree to a new 
ocean regime for the deep seabed –a commons deemed the “common heritage of 
mankind”.14 
                                                          
 9 Now, up to and Beyond 2012: The Bali Road Map, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/key_steps/bali_road_map/items/6072.php 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2013).  
 10 Durban: Towards full implementation of the UN Climate Change Convention, UNITED 
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/key_steps/durban_outcomes/items/6825.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).  
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Doha Amendment, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocaol/ doha_amendment/items/7362.php. 
 14 Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil 
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 
1933rd plen. Mtg, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (December 17, 1970), reprinted in [1971] 10 I.L.M. 220 
(1971).  
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Second, there is great difficulty in reaching agreement on legal obligations 
between developed countries and developing countries. Broadly stated, the 
developing countries argue that it is the developed, industrial, countries that caused 
the climate change problem and it is their responsibility (not the developing nations) 
to remedy it.15 The developed countries, for their part, argue that developing nations 
must take the world as they find it – a world with a need to curtail GHG and the 
developing countries must be part of the solution.  
Third, there is tension between efforts to mitigate GHG emissions and efforts to 
adapt to climate change. 16 Mitigation advocates argue that international climate 
change efforts should focus on stopping GHG emissions and adopting steps to curtail 
and limit GHG emissions. Adaptation advocates, to a significant degree, accept that 
climate change is occurring and that efforts should be taken to adapt to the change 
like building sea walls, changing agricultural crop selection, shifting food choices, 
conservation of fresh water resources, devising new building construction methods, 
etc. Those pushing for curtailment to mitigate climate change often view adaptation 
policies as a form of surrender in the battle to combat climate change that just diverts 
needed mitigation resources.  
Fourth, there continues to be a lack of agreement on the optimum mechanism to 
use to address curtailment of GHG. Some urge that a voluntary GHG reduction 
scheme be adopted. Others push for a command and control scheme administered 
through a formal international organization or regime. Others urge that a market-
based mechanism be utilized (some form of cap and trade mechanism similar to that 
used in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 which created a private market in  
emissions rights from stationary sources of air pollution (sulfur and other 
pollutants)).17  Still others urge the simple adoption of a carbon tax on GHG 
emissions from all sectors.18 
Finally, there is, of course, considerable political pressure from various, public 
and private, domestic and international, constituencies all attempting to influence the 
process and content of an ultimate international climate change regime or 
mechanism. 
                                                          
 15 For the developing countries position, see  Christine Batruch, “Hot Air” as Precedent 
for Developing Countries: Equity Considerations, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL L. AND POL’Y 45 (1998-
1999). 
 16 MICHAEL B. GERRARD & KATRINA FISCHER KUH, THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE 3-4 (2012). 
 17 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401 et seq.; See THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, ENERGY LAW AND 
POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, Environmental Protection and Energy Development, 5-13 
(2000). 
 18 See N. Gregory Mankiew, A Carbon Fee That America Could Live With, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 1, 2013. 
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C.  Some Enduring Principles from the Emerging Climate Change Regime 
Influencing Energy Prices.19 
Without meaningful legal agreement reached in some three decades of effort, it is 
tempting to dismiss the international climate change process as largely irrelevant to 
energy prices of GHG emitting energy products. Despite that lack of progress, there 
are certain overlapping, enduring, legal principles that have now become embedded 
in the process that should not be ignored in deciding whether, how and to what 
degree to reflect the present externality of GHG emissions in energy prices. Taken 
together, these principles, which have soft law20 and hard law aspects, will legally 
influence, to a greater or lesser degree, both international and domestic  costing of 
GHG emissions and the embedding of those costs in future energy prices of GHG 
emitting products from electricity to gasoline to natural gas. 
1.  Limited State Sovereignty over natural resources. 
This principle of limited state sovereignty over natural resources is relevant to 
addressing GHG emissions generated in energy fuel cycles especially by fossil fuel 
use. It is a longstanding fundament of international law that states have “permanent 
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources” including over fossil energy 
resources like coal, oil and natural gas that emit GHG.21 This is a strong notion in 
international law especially for developing nations.  However, it is also a fundament 
of international law that that sovereignty is not absolute in a variety of ways. The 
related principle of sovereign equality necessarily means that one state may not 
exercise its sovereignty (including sovereignty over energy natural wealth and 
resources) in a way that encroaches on the sovereignty of another state. This notion 
of state responsibility in using natural resources over which a state has  sovereignty 
is embodied in the general and well-recognized principle of international law, sic 
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (one must so use own as not to do injury to 
another).22 In an environmental air pollution context, the famous Trail Smelter 
Arbitration held that a State is responsible for injury to the neighboring territory by 
noxious fumes emanating from within its territory.23 And Principle 21 of the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment  further extended the limitation 
on state sovereignty in the exploitation of natural resources “to ensure” 
                                                          
 19 For a summation of the larger foundational predicates of the emerging international 
climate change regime including the principles referred to in this section, see ROWENA 
MAGUIRE, Foundations of International Climate Law: Objectives, Principles and Methods in 
Climate Change and the Law 83-110 (Hollo, Kalooves and Mehling, Eds., 2013); See 
generally, PHILLIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 231-290 
(2d Ed. 2003). 
 20 See ENERGY LAW GROUP, supra note 17, at 4-18-4-19.  
 21 United Nations Generally Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/5344/Add.1 and 
Add/1/Corr.1. A/L.412/Rev.2 (Dec. 14, 1962), reprinted in [1963] 2 I.L.M 223(1963).  
 22 The Corfu Channel Case, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).   
 23 Trail Smelter Arbitration (US v. CA), 3  R. Int’l  Arb. Awards 1905 (1949), 35 Am J. 
Int’l L. 684 (1941). 
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environmental damage is not caused to “areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction” and not just in neighboring state territory.24  
This principle of limitation on state sovereignty in the use of natural resources 
has been embedded in the emerging climate change regime from the outset. The 
1992 UNFCCC, which is aimed at stabilization of GHG emissions by States into the 
atmosphere, “recalls” in its preamble that: 
States have, in accordance with . . . principles of international law, the 
sovereign right to exploit  their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies, and the  responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to  the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction.25 
The limitation on state sovereignty with regard to use of energy natural resources 
extends to more specific action to prevent GHG emissions action as well and not just 
to account for acts already done that cause harm. Of course, this is a general 
principle in all environmental law the object of which is to prevent pollution from 
occurring. Article 2 of the UNFCCC states that its objective and the objective of all 
subsequent instruments is “to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.”26  
Arguably, this principle of limited state sovereignty over natural resources 
including a responsibility to prevent harm applies also to a state allowing or 
approving the pricing of energy products and goods in a way that unduly contributes 
to GHG that cause climate change and harm to other states, to commons areas, and 
to the global environment. 
2.  The Polluter Pays Principle. 
The polluter pays principle says that actors responsible for pollution (individuals, 
corporations, states etc.) should pay the costs associated with their polluting 
activities. Thus, if the limitations on state sovereignty are ignored and preventive 
action is not taken and pollution results in the form of GHG, then the polluter pays 
principle becomes relevant. That greenhouse gases like C02 are pollutants is not 
controversial.  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA held 
that the Clean Air Act authorizes federal regulation of emissions of carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouses because they are pollutants under the statute.27 
At the international climate change level, the principle is controversial and less 
accepted than other principles. At the same time, it is the principle that would have 
the most direct implications for energy prices and pricing. That is, under the 
principle, the costs of pollution in the form of GHG should be reflected in the prices 
                                                          
 24 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 
48/14/Rev.1 (1973); 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972). available at http://www1.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/instree/humanenvironment.html.  
 25 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio De Janeiro, Braz., 
June 3-14, 1992, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, preamble, (May 
9, 1992). http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/ items/1349.php. 
 26 Id.at art. 2.  
 27 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). 
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charged for energy products all along energy fuel cycles from production to 
consumption. However, at the international level the principle becomes somewhat 
problematic as it would have an impact both on state subsidies of various forms and 
on the issues surrounding the divide between developing and developed nations 
addressed in the principle below dealing with common but differentiated 
responsibilities. As a result the polluter pays is at best a soft law principle. For 
example, The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio 
Declaration) (a nonbinding soft law instrument) provides only that States “should 
endeavor”: 
To promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of 
economic instruments ,  taking into account the approach that the 
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of  pollution, with due 
regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and 
investment. 28 
This is the only formal appearance the principle makes in the international 
climate change regime process. It is not incorporated into the UNFCCC. However, 
the 2013 IMF Report referred to above in calling for removing economic energy 
subsidies and criticizing reduced availability of GHG emissions in underpriced 
energy could be viewed as an endorsement of the polluter pays principle.29  
The polluter pays principle in domestic law is better known and less 
controversial as a principle. Its articulation in the international climate change 
regime (at least in the Rio Declaration) supports its application in domestic energy 
pricing situations to include GHG emissions associated with energy transactions in 
energy prices. 
3.  The Precautionary Principle.30 
The precautionary principle is now a staple principle in international 
environmental law instruments generally and in the emerging international climate 
change regime in particular, although its precise meaning and scope of application is 
still evolving and variable. Generally, it is a significant extension of the polluter pays 
principle and the limitation on state sovereignty to not use natural resources in a way 
to do harm to neighboring states or commons. The precautionary principle generally 
raises an obligation in anticipation of conduct or activities that would result in harm. 
It also lessens the need for causation to be firmly established so that it may apply in 
cases of scientific uncertainty. It also may operate to shift the burden of proof – from 
the one claiming harm to establish environmental harm to potential polluters to 
establish that their action will not harm the environment.  The principle’s efficacy 
increases with level of risk of harm. 
 
                                                          
 28 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio De Janeiro, Braz., 
June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 16, 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/ 
Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163.  
 29 Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 3.  
 30 See generally James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining Precautionary Principle 
in International Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 423 (1995); SANDS, supra note 19, at 
266-79.  
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In the emerging climate change regime context, the principle is embedded as a 
soft law principle. 
Article 3 (3) of the UNFCCC provides that States “should”: 
Take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent, or minimize the 
causes of climate change  and mitigate its adverse effects. Where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack  of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, 
taking  into account that policies and measures to deal with climate 
change should be cost-effective so  as to ensure global benefits at the 
lowest possible cost.31 
This would seem to encourage appropriate governmental regulatory bodies like 
public service commissions and other governmental bodies to reflect the cost of 
anticipated GHG emissions in some manner into prices under their jurisdiction.   
4.  The Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Principle. 
This principle accepts in a climate change context, the self-evident reality that 
while States generally are legal sovereign equals, they are in reality not all the same. 
It also reflects the considerable divide in the emerging climate change regime 
between developed and developing nations and expressed in overarching equity and 
fairness terms. 
Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration provides in relevant part: 
In view of the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation, sates have common  but differentiated responsibilities. 
The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that  they 
bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the 
pressures their  societies place on the global environment and of the 
technologies and financial resources they command.32  
And, Article 3 (1) of the UNFCCC similarly provides: 
The parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations  of humankind on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated  responsibilities 
and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties 
should take the lead in combatting climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof. 
Thus, under this principle all states, developing and developed, have shared 
obligations to protect the climate system. However, the extent of those obligations 
differ in relation to their contribution to climate change and their ability to do 
something about it. As a result, the 1995 Kyoto Protocol calling for obligations to 
curtail GHG, excluded developing countries from binding obligations to reduce 
GHGs.33  
                                                          
 31 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, supra note 9, at art. 3.  
 32 United Nations Conference,, supra 28, at Principle 7.  
 33 See, AM. BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., 
1997 ANN. REP., ABA SECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
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For energy prices, this may mean that energy prices in developed countries might 
be under greater pressure to reflect the cost of GHG and under lesser or no pressure 
to include those costs in developing countries. 
5.  The Duty to Cooperate Principle. 
This principle of cooperation is firmly entrenched in international environmental 
law but often overlooked and undervalued in examining obligations of individuals, 
corporations and States.  It imposes at a minimum a duty to negotiate in good faith 
and may “translate into more specific commitments through techniques designed to 
ensure information sharing and participation in decision making”.34  
In a climate change context, the Rio Declaration in Principle 7 provides that 
“States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and 
restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem” and Principle 27 provides 
that “states and people shall cooperate in good faith”. 35 The UNFCCC Preamble 
“calls for the widest possible cooperation” and Article 3 (3) states that “The Parties 
should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system. 36 
This principle of cooperation would seem to support a disclosure of pricing 
information, components and methodology for energy fuel cycles that produce GHG 
by corporations and governmental regulatory bodies. 
IV.  CONCLUSION. 
This article accepts that science indicates that climate change is occurring by the 
accumulation of GHG in the atmosphere and that the use of fossil fuel sources of 
energy (primarily coal, oil, and natural gas) by humans contributes very significant 
amounts of GHG to the atmosphere. It also accepts that climate change, in turn, 
produces potentially adverse effects on global and local societies. It also accepts that 
there is a connection between GHG emissions and the price at which those fossil fuel 
energy products are bought and sold. 
The largely unsuccessful effort over the past three decades or so to forge an 
international regime to address climate and GHG emissions with meaningful legal 
obligations that are enforceable does not mean that effort is irrelevant to pricing of 
energy products that contribute GHG to the atmosphere. Several enduring hard law 
and soft law principles have become imbedded as a result of the climate change 
regime process that are, and will be, germane to energy pricing decisions.  Those 
principles include the principle of limited state sovereignty over the use of natural 
resource (including fossil fuel resources) to prevent extra territorial damage, the 
polluter pays principle, the precautionary principle, the common but differentiated 
responsibility principle, and the duty to cooperate.   
Domestic price regulators, advocates, energy corporations, legislatures, courts, 
and policy makers all should be aware of these principles in determining, setting, 
challenging and reviewing energy prices in the decades ahead. 
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